St. Michael's Square, Kyiv, July 2023. Photo by author.
Ongoing Research.
Book project
Advising War
Great powers frequently intervene in the conflicts of others using what is called security force assistance – a form of security cooperation targeted at weak militaries. Once they intervene in a conflict, however, great powers often find themselves with comparatively little leverage to influence its direction. To gain leverage under these conditions, the literature argues, interveners should condition aid on the partner’s behavior.
However, we observe that beyond carrots and sticks, states often use hands-on methods to engage with local militaries, like sending military advisors to embed at multiple levels of a military, from the tactical to the strategic. Using carrots and sticks doesn’t necessarily require embedding people within a local military, so states must hope to gain something else through this strategy. Why do states send military advisors to work with local militaries? What do advisors do? How do they complement other foreign policy tools of influence? I address these questions in my book project drawn from my dissertation, which won an honorable mention for Best Dissertation in 2022 from the American Political Science Association’s International Collaboration section.
I argue that the role of military advisors extends beyond building military effectiveness. They are also sent to acquire influence and control. Advisors use their local embeddedness to influence and shape how a local military behaves on many issues, ranging from the military's defense institutions to its treatment of the local population. They do this by monitoring the actions of their counterparts – thus complementing other tools like carrots and sticks – and leveraging personal relationships to develop influence.
The book project proceeds in three parts. First, I theorize why states deploy advisors and the mechanisms of monitoring and influence based on personal relationships. Second, I test the theory of advisor deployment using original quantitative data on advisor deployment by the United States, Russia/USSR, China, France, and the United Kingdom (1946-2019). While the case studies are focused on U.S. intervention, my quantitative data show that the theory is broadly applicable to other great powers. Third, I move to qualitative case studies of U.S. intervention in El Salvador (1979-91) and Ukraine (2014 – 2022). The case studies offer important within and across case variation. The United States had different interests from El Salvador and similar interests to Ukraine. Both countries had weak militaries, though they faced different kinds of threats. The case studies are based on extensive archival research, over 130 interviews with policymakers and advisors, as well as fieldwork in Germany, Poland, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine. The case studies allow me to examine the logic of advisor deployment, how advisors work with local militaries on the ground, and provide implications for the effectiveness of advisors.
Great powers frequently intervene in the conflicts of others using what is called security force assistance – a form of security cooperation targeted at weak militaries. Once they intervene in a conflict, however, great powers often find themselves with comparatively little leverage to influence its direction. To gain leverage under these conditions, the literature argues, interveners should condition aid on the partner’s behavior.
However, we observe that beyond carrots and sticks, states often use hands-on methods to engage with local militaries, like sending military advisors to embed at multiple levels of a military, from the tactical to the strategic. Using carrots and sticks doesn’t necessarily require embedding people within a local military, so states must hope to gain something else through this strategy. Why do states send military advisors to work with local militaries? What do advisors do? How do they complement other foreign policy tools of influence? I address these questions in my book project drawn from my dissertation, which won an honorable mention for Best Dissertation in 2022 from the American Political Science Association’s International Collaboration section.
I argue that the role of military advisors extends beyond building military effectiveness. They are also sent to acquire influence and control. Advisors use their local embeddedness to influence and shape how a local military behaves on many issues, ranging from the military's defense institutions to its treatment of the local population. They do this by monitoring the actions of their counterparts – thus complementing other tools like carrots and sticks – and leveraging personal relationships to develop influence.
The book project proceeds in three parts. First, I theorize why states deploy advisors and the mechanisms of monitoring and influence based on personal relationships. Second, I test the theory of advisor deployment using original quantitative data on advisor deployment by the United States, Russia/USSR, China, France, and the United Kingdom (1946-2019). While the case studies are focused on U.S. intervention, my quantitative data show that the theory is broadly applicable to other great powers. Third, I move to qualitative case studies of U.S. intervention in El Salvador (1979-91) and Ukraine (2014 – 2022). The case studies offer important within and across case variation. The United States had different interests from El Salvador and similar interests to Ukraine. Both countries had weak militaries, though they faced different kinds of threats. The case studies are based on extensive archival research, over 130 interviews with policymakers and advisors, as well as fieldwork in Germany, Poland, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine. The case studies allow me to examine the logic of advisor deployment, how advisors work with local militaries on the ground, and provide implications for the effectiveness of advisors.
NATO, Ukraine & Russia
“"Order Making on the Periphery: US Security Assistance to Ukraine (2014-2022)" (working paper).
What explains the form of security cooperation that great powers offer to partner states facing external threats? Why do great powers sometimes deliberately provide too little security assistance to deter a rival, instead of sending costly arms or allying? Existing explanations on the arms versus allying tradeoff have focused on entrapment risks. I argue that great powers weigh two main considerations when deciding on the form of security cooperation: first, whether the form of cooperation will deter or provoke, and second, whether to pursue deterrence or to use security cooperation as a means of maintaining or extending hegemonic order. When great powers fear provocation and are primarily interested in order making rather than deterrence, they are more likely to choose forms of security assistance that do not significantly alter the military balance. I build this theory through a case study of US security cooperation with Ukraine between 2014-2022, relying on qualitative evidence from over 100 interviews with US, allied, and Ukrainian policymakers and security cooperation providers. I then evaluate implications for contemporary US policy toward Taiwan.
"US Preponderance in NATO: The Role of Logistics, Intelligence & IT, Training, and Coordination." with Jordan Becker, Stephen Brooks, Hugo Meijer, and William Wohlforth (working paper).
Can the United States meet the pacing challenge of a rising China without reducing its commitment to NATO, and could Europe deter Russia without a US troop presence? Spurred by Russia’s war against Ukraine and the United States’ expensive response, a rising chorus of analysts and politicians argue that the US can and must free up resources for Asia by substantially drawing down its commitment—and troop presence—in Europe. In word and deed, the Biden administration disagrees. Like all grand strategy debates, this one is ultimately about power. We advance it by providing a necessary lens for understanding US power as an alliance partner. We argue that LIT2C—logistics, intelligence (strategic), training, cyber, and coordination—captures a hidden dimension of US preponderance in NATO and within its alliances more broadly. LIT2C includes the US contribution to multinational logistics efforts to transport, supply, and sustain NATO allies’ troops in the event of a war; strategic intelligence; training activities, exercises, and broader ways in which the United States shares knowledge within NATO; offensive and defensive cyber capabilities; and US coordination of allied procurement, war plans, and alliance decision-making. We show the full extent of US contributions in these areas, demonstrating that the existing analytical toolkit underestimates what the United States brings to the table in its alliances, and thus misses the security risks of a major US drawdown in Europe even as it exaggerates the costs of securing allies in Asia.
What explains the form of security cooperation that great powers offer to partner states facing external threats? Why do great powers sometimes deliberately provide too little security assistance to deter a rival, instead of sending costly arms or allying? Existing explanations on the arms versus allying tradeoff have focused on entrapment risks. I argue that great powers weigh two main considerations when deciding on the form of security cooperation: first, whether the form of cooperation will deter or provoke, and second, whether to pursue deterrence or to use security cooperation as a means of maintaining or extending hegemonic order. When great powers fear provocation and are primarily interested in order making rather than deterrence, they are more likely to choose forms of security assistance that do not significantly alter the military balance. I build this theory through a case study of US security cooperation with Ukraine between 2014-2022, relying on qualitative evidence from over 100 interviews with US, allied, and Ukrainian policymakers and security cooperation providers. I then evaluate implications for contemporary US policy toward Taiwan.
"US Preponderance in NATO: The Role of Logistics, Intelligence & IT, Training, and Coordination." with Jordan Becker, Stephen Brooks, Hugo Meijer, and William Wohlforth (working paper).
Can the United States meet the pacing challenge of a rising China without reducing its commitment to NATO, and could Europe deter Russia without a US troop presence? Spurred by Russia’s war against Ukraine and the United States’ expensive response, a rising chorus of analysts and politicians argue that the US can and must free up resources for Asia by substantially drawing down its commitment—and troop presence—in Europe. In word and deed, the Biden administration disagrees. Like all grand strategy debates, this one is ultimately about power. We advance it by providing a necessary lens for understanding US power as an alliance partner. We argue that LIT2C—logistics, intelligence (strategic), training, cyber, and coordination—captures a hidden dimension of US preponderance in NATO and within its alliances more broadly. LIT2C includes the US contribution to multinational logistics efforts to transport, supply, and sustain NATO allies’ troops in the event of a war; strategic intelligence; training activities, exercises, and broader ways in which the United States shares knowledge within NATO; offensive and defensive cyber capabilities; and US coordination of allied procurement, war plans, and alliance decision-making. We show the full extent of US contributions in these areas, demonstrating that the existing analytical toolkit underestimates what the United States brings to the table in its alliances, and thus misses the security risks of a major US drawdown in Europe even as it exaggerates the costs of securing allies in Asia.
Security force assistance
"I'll Be Watching You: Great Power Use of Military Advisors to Police their Proxies." (working paper).
Great powers frequently support local proxies with aid, arms, and military advisors to avoid the cost of fighting with their own combat troops. But relying on others has its own cost: proxies may not fully share the goals of their supporters. How can interveners manage their proxies to get more compliance? One way is to get as much information as possible about them. I derive implications from a formal model of proxy war about when interveners will invest in monitoring. I then conceptualize military advisors as a particularly effective form of monitoring and show how they work using archival evidence from the US Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam (1954-1960). By deploying advisors, interveners collect detailed information on the proxy military's behavior which they use to craft better carrots and sticks and to evaluate the success of the intervention. I evaluate implications from the model using original data on the global deployment of military advisors to support a party to a civil war by the United States, Russia/USSR, China, France, and the United Kingdom (1946 - 2019). Advisors are deployed more often to proxies with weak militaries who disagree significantly with their sponsors. This supports my theory of when states choose to invest in monitoring as well as provides implications for the effectiveness of intervention, as advisors are sent to the hardest cases.
Great powers frequently support local proxies with aid, arms, and military advisors to avoid the cost of fighting with their own combat troops. But relying on others has its own cost: proxies may not fully share the goals of their supporters. How can interveners manage their proxies to get more compliance? One way is to get as much information as possible about them. I derive implications from a formal model of proxy war about when interveners will invest in monitoring. I then conceptualize military advisors as a particularly effective form of monitoring and show how they work using archival evidence from the US Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam (1954-1960). By deploying advisors, interveners collect detailed information on the proxy military's behavior which they use to craft better carrots and sticks and to evaluate the success of the intervention. I evaluate implications from the model using original data on the global deployment of military advisors to support a party to a civil war by the United States, Russia/USSR, China, France, and the United Kingdom (1946 - 2019). Advisors are deployed more often to proxies with weak militaries who disagree significantly with their sponsors. This supports my theory of when states choose to invest in monitoring as well as provides implications for the effectiveness of intervention, as advisors are sent to the hardest cases.
Publications.
Chinchilla, Alexandra, Kyle Atwell, Alexis Bradstreet, Catherine Crombe, and Luther Leblanc. "Irregular Warfare and Strategic Competition." Defence Studies, 2023. doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2023.2279620
Chinchilla, Alexandra. "Formal Theory and Proxy Wars." in Routledge Handbook of Proxy Wars, edited by Moghadam Assaf, Vladimir Rauta, and Michel Wyss, 2023.
Chinchilla, Alexandra and Paul Poast. "Good for democracy? Evidence from the 2004 NATO expansion," in Goldgeier, J., Shifrinson, J.R.I. (eds), Evaluating NATO Enlargement, 2023 [reprint of International Politics piece in light of Russia's war in Ukraine].
See related article: Poast, Paul and Chinchilla, Alexandra. "Good for democracy? Evidence from the 2004 NATO expansion." International Politics. 2020.
Chinchilla, Alexandra and Jesse Driscoll. "Side-Switching as State-Building: the Case of Russian-Speaking Militias in Eastern Ukraine." Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. 2021.
"Forum - Conflict Delegation in Civil Wars," with Niklas Karlén, Vladimir Rauta, Idean Salehyan, Andrew Mumford, Belgin San-Akca, Alexandra Stark, Michel Wyss, Assaf Moghadam, Allard Duursma, Henning Tamm, Erin K Jenne, Milos Popovic, David S Siroky, Vanessa Meier, Kit Rickard, Giuseppe Spatafora. International Studies Review. 2021.
Pape, Robert A., Alejandro Albanez Rivas, and Alexandra C. Chinchilla. "Introducing the new CPOST dataset on suicide attacks." Journal of Peace Research. 2021.
Chinchilla, Alexandra and Poast, Paul. "Defense Institution Building from Above? Lessons from the Baltic Experience."Connections QJ. 2018.
Chinchilla, Alexandra. "Formal Theory and Proxy Wars." in Routledge Handbook of Proxy Wars, edited by Moghadam Assaf, Vladimir Rauta, and Michel Wyss, 2023.
Chinchilla, Alexandra and Paul Poast. "Good for democracy? Evidence from the 2004 NATO expansion," in Goldgeier, J., Shifrinson, J.R.I. (eds), Evaluating NATO Enlargement, 2023 [reprint of International Politics piece in light of Russia's war in Ukraine].
See related article: Poast, Paul and Chinchilla, Alexandra. "Good for democracy? Evidence from the 2004 NATO expansion." International Politics. 2020.
Chinchilla, Alexandra and Jesse Driscoll. "Side-Switching as State-Building: the Case of Russian-Speaking Militias in Eastern Ukraine." Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. 2021.
"Forum - Conflict Delegation in Civil Wars," with Niklas Karlén, Vladimir Rauta, Idean Salehyan, Andrew Mumford, Belgin San-Akca, Alexandra Stark, Michel Wyss, Assaf Moghadam, Allard Duursma, Henning Tamm, Erin K Jenne, Milos Popovic, David S Siroky, Vanessa Meier, Kit Rickard, Giuseppe Spatafora. International Studies Review. 2021.
Pape, Robert A., Alejandro Albanez Rivas, and Alexandra C. Chinchilla. "Introducing the new CPOST dataset on suicide attacks." Journal of Peace Research. 2021.
Chinchilla, Alexandra and Poast, Paul. "Defense Institution Building from Above? Lessons from the Baltic Experience."Connections QJ. 2018.