Security cooperation & assistance.
Book project: Advising War.
The record of US security force assistance over the past two decades shows that it often fails to build capacity or further other objectives like the rule of law, anti-corruption, and human rights. For example, consider the Iraqi Army’s collapse during the Islamic State’s advance into Mosul, and the coups and human rights abuses committed by US-trained militaries. The literature argues that improving these outcomes requires security assistance providers to use carrots and sticks at the strategic level, conditioning aid provided to a partner military on its behavior (Ladwig 2017; Berman & Lake 2019).
However, instead of or in addition to using carrots and sticks, security assistance providers often use very hands-on methods to engage with local militaries, like sending military advisors to embed with their counterparts at multiple levels from the strategic to the tactical. Using carrots and sticks doesn’t necessarily require embedding people within a local military, so states must hope to gain something else through this strategy. Why do states send military advisors to work with local militaries? How do advisors intersect with the bigger picture of managing local militaries? Do advisors end up fulfilling the expectations their sending states have for them?
Focusing on the deployment of advisors during conflict, I argue that while we often think about advisors as purely technical military experts, security assistance providers expect them to directly engage with the compliance issue. States send advisors to weak militaries with low military effectiveness and/or high conflicts of interest with the intervening state. Advisors are expected to use their local embeddedness to influence and shape how a local military behaves – on a multiplicity of issues that depends on the conflict and can range from building defense institutions to the military’s treatment of the local population. Advisors are tasked with monitoring the actions of their counterparts – thus complementing other tools like carrots and sticks – and leveraging personal relationships to develop influence. States deploy military advisors with the expectation that they will lead to meaningful changes in how the local military approaches issues like military strategy, human rights, civil-military relations, and the foreign policy priorities of its great power patron.
The book project proceeds in three parts. First, I theorize why states deploy advisors and the mechanisms of monitoring and influence based on personal relationships. Second, I test the theory of advisor deployment using quantitative data on advisor deployment by the United States, Russia/USSR, China, France, and the United Kingdom. While the case studies are focused on US intervention, the quantitative data show that the theory is more broadly applicable to other great powers. Third, I move to qualitative case studies of US intervention in El Salvador (1979-91), a case of low military capacity and low interest alignment, and US intervention in Ukraine (2014 – 2022), a case of low capacity and high interest alignment. The case studies allow me to examine the logic of advisor deployment, how advisors work with local militaries on the ground and the (dis)connection between policy and local implementation, as well as provide some implications for the effectiveness of advisors as a means of influence.
However, instead of or in addition to using carrots and sticks, security assistance providers often use very hands-on methods to engage with local militaries, like sending military advisors to embed with their counterparts at multiple levels from the strategic to the tactical. Using carrots and sticks doesn’t necessarily require embedding people within a local military, so states must hope to gain something else through this strategy. Why do states send military advisors to work with local militaries? How do advisors intersect with the bigger picture of managing local militaries? Do advisors end up fulfilling the expectations their sending states have for them?
Focusing on the deployment of advisors during conflict, I argue that while we often think about advisors as purely technical military experts, security assistance providers expect them to directly engage with the compliance issue. States send advisors to weak militaries with low military effectiveness and/or high conflicts of interest with the intervening state. Advisors are expected to use their local embeddedness to influence and shape how a local military behaves – on a multiplicity of issues that depends on the conflict and can range from building defense institutions to the military’s treatment of the local population. Advisors are tasked with monitoring the actions of their counterparts – thus complementing other tools like carrots and sticks – and leveraging personal relationships to develop influence. States deploy military advisors with the expectation that they will lead to meaningful changes in how the local military approaches issues like military strategy, human rights, civil-military relations, and the foreign policy priorities of its great power patron.
The book project proceeds in three parts. First, I theorize why states deploy advisors and the mechanisms of monitoring and influence based on personal relationships. Second, I test the theory of advisor deployment using quantitative data on advisor deployment by the United States, Russia/USSR, China, France, and the United Kingdom. While the case studies are focused on US intervention, the quantitative data show that the theory is more broadly applicable to other great powers. Third, I move to qualitative case studies of US intervention in El Salvador (1979-91), a case of low military capacity and low interest alignment, and US intervention in Ukraine (2014 – 2022), a case of low capacity and high interest alignment. The case studies allow me to examine the logic of advisor deployment, how advisors work with local militaries on the ground and the (dis)connection between policy and local implementation, as well as provide some implications for the effectiveness of advisors as a means of influence.
NATO, Ukraine & Russia.
“US Preponderance in NATO: The Role of Logistics, Intelligence & IT, Training, and Coordination.” with Jordan Becker, Stephen Brooks, Hugo Meijer, and William Wohlforth (work in progress).
Can the United States meet the pacing challenge of a rising China without reducing its commitment to NATO, and could Europe deter Russia without a US troop presence? Spurred by Russia’s war against Ukraine and the United States’ expensive response, a rising chorus of analysts and politicians argue that the US can and must free up resources for Asia by substantially drawing down its commitment—and troop presence—in Europe. In word and deed, the Biden administration disagrees. Like all grand strategy debates, this one is ultimately about power. We advance it by providing a necessary lens for understanding US power as an alliance partner. We argue that LIT2C—logistics, intelligence (strategic), training, cyber, and coordination—captures a hidden dimension of US preponderance in NATO and within its alliances more broadly. LIT2C includes the US contribution to multinational logistics efforts to transport, supply, and sustain NATO allies’ troops in the event of a war; strategic intelligence; training activities, exercises, and broader ways in which the United States shares knowledge within NATO; offensive and defensive cyber capabilities; and US coordination of allied procurement, war plans, and alliance decision-making. We show the full extent of US contributions in these areas, demonstrating that the existing analytical toolkit underestimates what the United States brings to the table in its alliances, and thus misses the security risks of a major US drawdown in Europe even as it exaggerates the costs of securing allies in Asia.
Chinchilla, Alexandra and Jesse Driscoll. Side-Switching as State-Building: the Case of Russian-Speaking Militias in Eastern Ukraine. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. 2021.
Why do some militias bandwagon with the state during a civil war while others resist state authority? A formal model highlighting the role of material incentives treats militia commanders as rent-seekers competing for security sector jobs run by civilians. Western donors can send aid to inflate the size of the pie that civilians distribute to militia commanders. Our key result is a partial incorporation equilibrium by which jointly-sustainable strategies selected by a minimum winning coalition of battalion commanders maximize their share of rents. Battalion commanders outside this coalition do best by remaining outside the state. We evaluate the model using an analytic narrative of contemporary Ukraine – a hard case for our theory since ideology and ethnicity play an important role in most standard accounts of the conflict. Analysis of a volunteer battalion incorporation dataset, results from a survey of 64 Ukrainian volunteer battalion members, and a short discussion of the Azov Battalion suggest the salience of intra-Ukrainian distributional politics to militia commanders’ incorporation strategies.
Chinchilla, Alexandra and Paul Poast. "Good for democracy? Evidence from the 2004 NATO expansion," in Goldgeier, J., Shifrinson, J.R.I. (eds), Evaluating NATO Enlargement, 2023 [reprint of International Politics piece in light of Russia's war in Ukraine].
After Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, democracy is more central to NATO’s identity now than ever. Existing scholarship offers conflicting answers to whether NATO has historically proved successful at democracy promotion. We revisit this debate by focusing on the 2004 NATO expansion to include the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. We leverage the fact that we now have as many years of data since NATO entry as between the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 2004 NATO expansion. We show that NATO membership and anticipation thereof had little to no influence on democratic development in Eastern Europe, though anticipation of European Union membership is associated with higher democracy scores. NATO was not a necessary condition for democratic survival in Eastern Europe, but it may have played a secondary role by protecting new members from greater Russian subversion.
See related article: Poast, Paul and Chinchilla, Alexandra. Good for democracy? Evidence from the 2004 NATO expansion. International Politics. 2020.
Chinchilla, Alexandra and Poast, Paul. Defense Institution Building from Above? Lessons from the Baltic Experience. Connections QJ. 2018.
Defense institution building (DIB) seeks to create the means and mechanisms that enable effective capability aggregation within NATO. Can external assistance with DIB help states become suitable NATO members? We discuss the post-Cold War experience of the Baltic States to understand the role of external assistance in defense institution building and how this can enable a state to gain NATO membership. We then consider whether lessons in the Baltic experience are applicable to Georgia and Ukraine.
Can the United States meet the pacing challenge of a rising China without reducing its commitment to NATO, and could Europe deter Russia without a US troop presence? Spurred by Russia’s war against Ukraine and the United States’ expensive response, a rising chorus of analysts and politicians argue that the US can and must free up resources for Asia by substantially drawing down its commitment—and troop presence—in Europe. In word and deed, the Biden administration disagrees. Like all grand strategy debates, this one is ultimately about power. We advance it by providing a necessary lens for understanding US power as an alliance partner. We argue that LIT2C—logistics, intelligence (strategic), training, cyber, and coordination—captures a hidden dimension of US preponderance in NATO and within its alliances more broadly. LIT2C includes the US contribution to multinational logistics efforts to transport, supply, and sustain NATO allies’ troops in the event of a war; strategic intelligence; training activities, exercises, and broader ways in which the United States shares knowledge within NATO; offensive and defensive cyber capabilities; and US coordination of allied procurement, war plans, and alliance decision-making. We show the full extent of US contributions in these areas, demonstrating that the existing analytical toolkit underestimates what the United States brings to the table in its alliances, and thus misses the security risks of a major US drawdown in Europe even as it exaggerates the costs of securing allies in Asia.
Chinchilla, Alexandra and Jesse Driscoll. Side-Switching as State-Building: the Case of Russian-Speaking Militias in Eastern Ukraine. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. 2021.
Why do some militias bandwagon with the state during a civil war while others resist state authority? A formal model highlighting the role of material incentives treats militia commanders as rent-seekers competing for security sector jobs run by civilians. Western donors can send aid to inflate the size of the pie that civilians distribute to militia commanders. Our key result is a partial incorporation equilibrium by which jointly-sustainable strategies selected by a minimum winning coalition of battalion commanders maximize their share of rents. Battalion commanders outside this coalition do best by remaining outside the state. We evaluate the model using an analytic narrative of contemporary Ukraine – a hard case for our theory since ideology and ethnicity play an important role in most standard accounts of the conflict. Analysis of a volunteer battalion incorporation dataset, results from a survey of 64 Ukrainian volunteer battalion members, and a short discussion of the Azov Battalion suggest the salience of intra-Ukrainian distributional politics to militia commanders’ incorporation strategies.
Chinchilla, Alexandra and Paul Poast. "Good for democracy? Evidence from the 2004 NATO expansion," in Goldgeier, J., Shifrinson, J.R.I. (eds), Evaluating NATO Enlargement, 2023 [reprint of International Politics piece in light of Russia's war in Ukraine].
After Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, democracy is more central to NATO’s identity now than ever. Existing scholarship offers conflicting answers to whether NATO has historically proved successful at democracy promotion. We revisit this debate by focusing on the 2004 NATO expansion to include the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. We leverage the fact that we now have as many years of data since NATO entry as between the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 2004 NATO expansion. We show that NATO membership and anticipation thereof had little to no influence on democratic development in Eastern Europe, though anticipation of European Union membership is associated with higher democracy scores. NATO was not a necessary condition for democratic survival in Eastern Europe, but it may have played a secondary role by protecting new members from greater Russian subversion.
See related article: Poast, Paul and Chinchilla, Alexandra. Good for democracy? Evidence from the 2004 NATO expansion. International Politics. 2020.
Chinchilla, Alexandra and Poast, Paul. Defense Institution Building from Above? Lessons from the Baltic Experience. Connections QJ. 2018.
Defense institution building (DIB) seeks to create the means and mechanisms that enable effective capability aggregation within NATO. Can external assistance with DIB help states become suitable NATO members? We discuss the post-Cold War experience of the Baltic States to understand the role of external assistance in defense institution building and how this can enable a state to gain NATO membership. We then consider whether lessons in the Baltic experience are applicable to Georgia and Ukraine.
Commentary on NATO, Ukraine & Russia.
Alexandra Chinchilla and Jahara Matisek. "Ukraine's Hidden Advantage: How European Trainers Have Transformed Kyiv's Army and Changed the War." Foreign Affairs. May 11, 2023.
Alexandra Chinchilla. "Security Assistance Worked in Ukraine." The Defense Post. March 14, 2022.
Roundtable discussion, “Ukraine: What is to Come?” November 17, 2022, hosted by Northwestern University and the Irregular Warfare Initiative.
Alexandra Chinchilla. "Security Assistance Worked in Ukraine." The Defense Post. March 14, 2022.
Roundtable discussion, “Ukraine: What is to Come?” November 17, 2022, hosted by Northwestern University and the Irregular Warfare Initiative.
Proxy war & political violence.
Chinchilla, Alexandra. "Formal Models and Proxy War Studies." in the Routledge Handbook of Proxy Wars, edited by Moghadam Assaf, Vladimir Rauta, and Michel Wyss (under contract).
Can sponsors influence the behavior of their proxies? Is so, how? Formal principal-agent models of proxy war produce two main findings. First, information asymmetries complicate but do not prevent a productive sponsor-proxy relationship. Even when sponsors can only imperfectly observe the proxy’s actions, carrots and sticks, when used, help the sponsor gain more compliance from the proxy. Second, when commitment problems are present, principals struggle to incentivize cooperation from their agents. However, although rewards and punishments work when used, sponsors often do not use them consistently with their agents. I propose directions for future models to address this puzzle: giving the proxy more agency to impose costs on the principal, incorporating the proxy’s domestic politics, and examining the bounded rationality of both actors. Other fruitful directions for future models include incorporating multiple principals, exploring different sources of asymmetric information, and evaluating whether the ally principle truly applies to proxy war.
Chinchilla, Alexandra, Kit Rickard, Giuseppe Spatafora, "Ways Forward: A Research Agenda on Conflict Delegation." in Forum: Conflict Delegation in Civil Wars. International Studies Review. 2021.
This forum provides an outlet for an assessment of research on the delegation of war to non-state armed groups in civil wars. Given the significant growth of studies concerned with this phenomenon over the last decade, this forum critically engages with the present state of the field. First, we canvass some of the most important theoretical developments to demonstrate the heterogeneity of the debate. Second, we expand on the theme of complexity and investigate its multiple facets as a window into pushing the debate forward. Third, we draw the contours of a future research agenda by highlighting some contemporary problems, puzzles, and challenges to empirical data collection. In essence, we seek to connect two main literatures that have been talking past each other: external support in civil wars and proxy warfare. The forum bridges this gap at a critical juncture in this new and emerging scholarship by offering space for scholarly dialogue across conceptual labels.
Pape, Robert A., Alejandro Albanez Rivas, and Alexandra C. Chinchilla. Introducing the new CPOST dataset on suicide attacks. Journal of Peace Research. 2021.
The University of Chicago Project on Security and Threats presents the updated and expanded Database on Suicide Attacks (DSAT), which now links to Uppsala Conflict Data Program data on armed conflicts and includes a new dataset measuring the alliance and rivalry relationships among militant groups with connections to suicide attack groups. We assess global trends in suicide attacks over four decades, and demonstrate the value of the expanded DSAT with special attention to the growing diffusion of suicide attacks in armed conflicts and the large role of networks established by Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State through 2019 in this diffusion. Overall, the expanded DSAT demonstrates the advantages of integration across datasets of political violence for expanding research on important outcomes, generating new knowledge about the spread of particularly deadly forms of political violence, and raising important new questions about the efficacy of current policies to curb their spread.
Can sponsors influence the behavior of their proxies? Is so, how? Formal principal-agent models of proxy war produce two main findings. First, information asymmetries complicate but do not prevent a productive sponsor-proxy relationship. Even when sponsors can only imperfectly observe the proxy’s actions, carrots and sticks, when used, help the sponsor gain more compliance from the proxy. Second, when commitment problems are present, principals struggle to incentivize cooperation from their agents. However, although rewards and punishments work when used, sponsors often do not use them consistently with their agents. I propose directions for future models to address this puzzle: giving the proxy more agency to impose costs on the principal, incorporating the proxy’s domestic politics, and examining the bounded rationality of both actors. Other fruitful directions for future models include incorporating multiple principals, exploring different sources of asymmetric information, and evaluating whether the ally principle truly applies to proxy war.
Chinchilla, Alexandra, Kit Rickard, Giuseppe Spatafora, "Ways Forward: A Research Agenda on Conflict Delegation." in Forum: Conflict Delegation in Civil Wars. International Studies Review. 2021.
This forum provides an outlet for an assessment of research on the delegation of war to non-state armed groups in civil wars. Given the significant growth of studies concerned with this phenomenon over the last decade, this forum critically engages with the present state of the field. First, we canvass some of the most important theoretical developments to demonstrate the heterogeneity of the debate. Second, we expand on the theme of complexity and investigate its multiple facets as a window into pushing the debate forward. Third, we draw the contours of a future research agenda by highlighting some contemporary problems, puzzles, and challenges to empirical data collection. In essence, we seek to connect two main literatures that have been talking past each other: external support in civil wars and proxy warfare. The forum bridges this gap at a critical juncture in this new and emerging scholarship by offering space for scholarly dialogue across conceptual labels.
Pape, Robert A., Alejandro Albanez Rivas, and Alexandra C. Chinchilla. Introducing the new CPOST dataset on suicide attacks. Journal of Peace Research. 2021.
The University of Chicago Project on Security and Threats presents the updated and expanded Database on Suicide Attacks (DSAT), which now links to Uppsala Conflict Data Program data on armed conflicts and includes a new dataset measuring the alliance and rivalry relationships among militant groups with connections to suicide attack groups. We assess global trends in suicide attacks over four decades, and demonstrate the value of the expanded DSAT with special attention to the growing diffusion of suicide attacks in armed conflicts and the large role of networks established by Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State through 2019 in this diffusion. Overall, the expanded DSAT demonstrates the advantages of integration across datasets of political violence for expanding research on important outcomes, generating new knowledge about the spread of particularly deadly forms of political violence, and raising important new questions about the efficacy of current policies to curb their spread.
Other writing on proxy war.
Alexandra Chinchilla. Review of Groh, Tyrone L., Proxy War: The Least Bad Option. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. May 2020.
Rauta, Vladimir, Matthew Ayton, Alexandra Chinchilla, Andreas Krieg, Christopher Rickard & Jean-Marc Rickli. A Symposium – debating ‘surrogate warfare’ and the transformation of war, Defence Studies, 19:4, 410-430, 2019.
Rauta, Vladimir, Matthew Ayton, Alexandra Chinchilla, Andreas Krieg, Christopher Rickard & Jean-Marc Rickli. A Symposium – debating ‘surrogate warfare’ and the transformation of war, Defence Studies, 19:4, 410-430, 2019.